This piece by David Sanger reminds me of several points that have gone unmentioned in the discussions of the President’s new Afghan policy:
1. The policy and troop surge is not intended to “defeat” the Taliban; indeed, there’s a recognition that the Tals will always be a part of the picture in Afghanistan. The intent of the policy is to push them back, weaken them, try to convince some to reconcile–especially those Taliban who are mostly interested in local, not national or religious, issues (like controlling their home valleys). The goal is stability, not “victory” since victory is not attainable.
2. Obama followed most of the policy recommendations laid out by Stanley McChrystal in his famed Initial Assessment of last August, but there was one notable omission: the training targets for the Afghan National Army and police–250,000 and 140,000 respectively–were absent. In fact, the President refused to indulge in a training numbers game, which reflect the general pessimism about our ability to create plausible national forces. (There is some mild hope that we will enable the Afghans to build security from the bottom up, via tribal militias).