The revolution taking place in the Middle East has a kaleidoscope of causes, occurring along at least four different fragmentary fault lines:
–youthful social networkers v. elderly power-clingers (as in Tunisia and Egypt)
–religious v. secular (also, possibly, Egypt–if the reports of yesterday’s elections are accurate; and potentially Yemen)
–tribe v. tribe (as in Libya)
–Sunni v. Shi’ite (Bahrain, potentially Saudi Arabia and possibly Syria)
The weekend uprisings in Syria take place in a classic mafia-style autarchy, run by the Assad family. It has Facebook and classic human rights elements, but beneath those is the longtime, brutally suppressed impatience of the Sunni majority in Syria with the Alawite minority who practice a form of Shi’ism. The Assad family are Alewites; they famously massacred thousands of Sunnis in the city of Hama in 1982 to quash a rebellion by the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood. They have made their alliance with the Shi’ite powers in the region: Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
And now, the clash between Sunni and Shi’ite is taking on an increased trans-national importance in the region as the rebellions move into their third month. The Saudis are particularly worried about the rising Shi’ite power to its East and North–that is why it quickly moved troops into Sunni-ruled, Shi’ite majority Bahrain. The preponderance of Saudi oil is located in its Eastern Province, which is predominantly Shi’ite. Iraq, on Saudi’s northern border, teeters between a wobbly democracy and a populist Shi’ite movement led by Muqtadr Sadr. All of these movements receive surreptitious support and encouragement from Iran.
It is widely feared among Middle Eastern Sunnis that Iran has benefitted most from the recent upheavals, which have weakened the Sunni powerhouses in Egypt and Saudi. This may or may not be true: Iran itself is wobbling beneath the impact of UN economic sanctions and its own, suppressed people-power movement. But if Syria becomes the next revolutionary theater, I wouldn’t be surprised if the Sunni powers in the region do as they perceive Iran to have done: provide covert support to an anti-Alawite people-power movement. This could lead to a more open conflict between Shi’ites and Sunnis in the region. (It is also striking how, yet again, the interests of Israel and its Sunni neighbors–especially Saudi Arabia–align.)
