The New York Times has the latest in the struggle between Iran’s right and far-right–between the so-called traditional conservative “principalists” and the populist-extremists led by the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad–which seems, finally, to be bubbling to the surface. This is a crucial conflict–these two groups, not the Green movement, are probably the real contenders to shape Iran’s future–and it is a nearly incomprehensible one to outsiders (and even to most Iranians). When I was in Iran last year, there was a lot of bitching and moaning about Ahmadinejad among the principalists I interviewed, with three, possibly four, schisms between the groups:
1. Economics–Ahmadinejad has pursued an aggressive and inflationary program of wealth redistribution, with massive subsidies for the poor, who represent his fervent base of supporters (again, Ahmadinejad might have won the election if the votes had really been counted; it certainly would have been close). The principalists favor a more, well, conservative path: using the oil revenues to build for long-term stability and growth.
2. Religion–Ahmadinejad’s supporters tend to be more ecstatic and eschatological. Many see him as a divinely designated precursor for the return of the Mahdi (the Shi’ite End of Days myth is strikingly similar to the Rapture); the principalists are less melodramatic and tend to follow the sophisticated legal and intellectual practices of the traditional Qom clerics..
3.Age– Ahmadinejad’s supporters are younger, with a significant base in the Revolutionary Guard; the principalist leaders have their roots in the revolutionary circle that surrounded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (although this divide is hard to gauge, and the Green Movement, which is closer to the principalists, is mostly composed of young people, too).
4. Foreign Policy–the “principalists” I interviewed insisted to me that they might be more accomodating than Ahmadinejad. They were embarrassed by his over-the-top rhetoric, especially about Israel. Their bazaari faction was anxious to do business with the outside world and therefore favored a more moderate stance internationally. And yet, when Iran’s negotiators cut the nuclear fuel exchange deal in Vienna last autumn, most of the “principalists” opposed it (as did the leaders of the Green Movement), in large part because Ahmadinejad favored it. Go figure.
This is just a guess, but I suspect that the new round of sanctions–which hit the bazaaris hard, with a sophisticated (and under-publicized) set of banking regulations–may be turning up the political heat in Iran. A round of parliamentary elections are coming, where the contest between the right and far right will take center stage.
A final thought: the Supreme Leader has ties to both camps–the principalist Larijani brothers are among his closest advisors–and the skill with which he has navigated this rift is impressive.
