In the Arena

Afghan Baghdad?

The U.S. military “took” the Afghan city of Marja, in the poppy-growing heart of Helmand Province, a few weeks ago. Now comes the hard part, as this story by the NY Times’ Rod Nordland makes clear. It reminds me a bit of the “taking” of Baghdad in three weeks after the start of the Iraq War: Baghdad wasn’t really stabilized until five years later, when the U.S. military switched to counterinsurgency tactics, placing troops in every neighborhood (in conjunction with a much-improved Iraqi military force).

Marja is much smaller than Baghdad, of course. But the success of the operation is going to depend entirely on the quality of Afghan government personnel involved in the stabilization process–not just Afghan security forces, but also civilians involved in the justice, education and sanitation sectors. I’ll be heading to Afghanistan soon to take a closer look at the situation, but my sense is that the Afghan Army and police aren’t nearly up to the task of controlling the city yet.

General McChrystal promised “government in a box,” which would arrive after the city was secured. Turns out that was a double entendre: for the moment, the government trying to stabilize Marja is in a box…and that box is called daylight. The Taliban control the night. It is an open question–the most important question of this operation–when and whether the Afghan government will be able to control Marja day and night.

Related Topics: Uncategorized
  • Latest on Swampland

    Pete Souza / The White House via Getty Images

    Political Picures of the Week, May 18-25

    TIME’s photo editors bring you the best pictures of the past week from the Beltway and beyond.

    Obama Administration Blocks Global Health Fund To Fight Disease In Developing NationsHuffPost Politics

    From left: AP; ABACAUSA

    The Phony War: Obama and Romney Are Debating Character, Not Policy

    More than five months from Election Day, the back-and-forth about Mitt Romney’s record at Bain already feels played out. Unfortunately, there’s good reason to expect the campaign continues in this vein indefinitely. Neither Barack Obama nor Mitt Romney are terribly interested in dwelling on policy platforms. Romney’s plan to slash spending and keep taxes low on the wealthy isn’t especially popular, at least not at any level of detail beyond a blithe promise to shrink the deficit. Meanwhile, Obama’s signature first-term achievements, like health care, the stimulus and Wall Street reform, are all unpopular or tricky to sell. (The Dodd-Frank bill is the most popular of these, but hyping it means offending wealthy donors.) So what we’re getting instead is a superficial duel about character–and, worse, one that’s based on the largely false premise that the better man can better “manage” the economy back to health.

  • afguy

    Modified version of “Whack-a-mole”?

  • afguy

    I think we’re going to be able to “take” any parcel of Afghan real estate we want to.
    .
    The opponents will simply melt away gradually (doing as much damage/delaying us as much they can in the process, without suffering too many casualties), then appear later in a different place and at a different time to start this all over again.

  • michaelfury

    “The Taliban control the night”

    Does NG flow at night, Mr. Klein?

    http://michaelfury.wordpress.com/2009/05/11/the-gas-must-flow/

  • koabd

    “General McChrystal promised “government in a box,” which would arrive after the city was secured. Turns out that was a double entendre: for the moment, the government trying to stabilize Marja is in a box…and that box is called daylight. The Taliban control the night.”
    .
    I think this is indicative of a more fundamental problem with the policy: we’re building institutions that cannot possibly function without foreign military and logisitical support. I view this as a different issue than propping up corrupt governments, because a competent government would fail just as easily if it needs American troops and planes ensuring its survival.
    .
    Any student of government knows that one of the foundations of a functioning government is having a monopoly on the use of force. That is to say, it can ward off any internal challenge to is legal hold on power. So, we’re building an Afghan military — really an Afghan light infantry — and an Afghan police establishment that are modeled on principles of Western militaries and police forces: air support, mechanized calvary and overwhelming firepower. And it seems that when those elements are available (re: Western forces supplying them), the indigenous forces work out well. But if President Obama seriously plans on us leaving Afghanistan, then there’s no way that we can leave behind a security apparatus does not have the means to fight war in the manner its been trained.
    .
    This circles back the governing problem — no matter how competent the administrators are, if their troops will fold because they can’t call in an airstrike, then we’re really just counting down the days until the Taliban and allied forces march back into Kabul. I find it highly troubling that none of the trainers of the Afghan forces are considering this as they prepare these young men for battle.

  • afguy

    I find it highly troubling that none of the trainers of the Afghan forces are considering this as they prepare these young men for battle.
    .
    koabd,
    .
    See previous discussions we had regarding our lack of long-range planning and decision-making…
    .
    It’s more “crisis management” than anything else… solve the obvious problem NOW… worry about the fall-out (or unforeseen consequences) later..
    .
    It’s literally KILLING us… and the Afghans or Iraqis.
    .
    It’s almost like we’re just trying different things in combination, hoping SOMETHING jumps out and starts working, so we can get the h*ll out of there with our pride intact.

  • koabd

    “See previous discussions we had regarding our lack of long-range planning and decision-making…”
    .
    Good grief. I wish you would go back and read what I actually wrote. Your straw man arguments really are becoming tiresome. I mean…really tiring.
    .
    Here’s the link to the thread for you and anyone else who’s interested in the conversation: http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/03/17/re-rock-bottom/#comments

  • afguy

    koabd,
    .
    I’m trying to agree with you here.
    .
    You’re talking about a lack of planning in Afghanistan … so am I.
    .
    If you want to go back and fight that old thread, fine, let go THERE.
    .
    Otherwise, take your little temper tantrum and stuff it!

  • koabd

    “Otherwise, take your little temper tantrum and stuff it!”
    .
    Sorry, afguy. No temper tantrum on my end. If you were trying to agree with me, there’d be no need to point to yesterday — it came across as if you were attempting to launch into another lecture about points I didn’t make. And if you really want to discuss yesterday, I wasn’t actually fighting: you were. (In my hast, I posted the link to the wrong thread — http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/03/17/populism-in-iraq/#comments)
    .
    Now, if you want to let bygones be bygones, fine. So, I’ve said my piece and I’m done with it.

  • afguy

    koabd: perhaps it is simply that I am disagreeing with you in the wrong way, then?
    .
    Maybe you need to post a summary of your personal “disagreement protocol” for all of us here, so that we can avoid future little meltdowns like the one exhibited above by couching our arguments in a way you will find acceptable.

  • afguy

    koabd: I’m willing too. I think we’re on the same page in all of this, actually.

  • pintortwo

    koabd, good points. And here:
    .
    But if President Obama seriously plans on us leaving Afghanistan, then there’s no way that we can leave behind a security apparatus does not have the means to fight war in the manner its been trained.
    .
    I agree. I’m sure the military knows this. Considering that Obama has defered to his generals, I think we can assume that the military has no intention of leaving any time soon.

  • Ike Jakson

    Joe

    Iraq has now had an election; there is nothing that you can contribute to it now. Don’t meddle; it’s up to them now.

    Afghan? Well, you know as they say ‘a poppy is also a flower’ but you are not. There is nothing you can contribute there either. Read what the people will say here; perhaps you learn something.

    http://ikejakson.wordpress.com/2010/03/18/joe-the-fumbler-on-the-ropes/

  • pintortwo

    Mr. Klein, good luck in Afghanistan, be safe.
    .
    Please try to find out why the military feels Marja is important. According to Gareth Porter (link), it is “a town of less than 50,000 people” and “only one of a number of logistical centers used by the Taliban in Helmand province.” That “most of the Taliban fighters who had been in Marjah before the beginning of the operation apparently moved out of the town before the fighting started.”
    .
    Most importantly, according to Porter, the Marja offensive is to “to influence domestic U.S. opinion on the war in Afghanistan” and get a quick win inorder to convince the American public that the military deserves more time to conduct its strategies. In other words, the military doesn’t want to leave and is trying to lay the foundation for long-term engagement.
    .
    I would appreciate if you ask about this.

  • koabd

    “I agree. I’m sure the military knows this. Considering that Obama has defered to his generals, I think we can assume that the military has no intention of leaving any time soon.”
    .
    I’m not sure that it’s the military not wanting to leave — they understand what the operational pace is doing to their forces — but that they really don’t know how to train a military and police force to fight in unconventional (re: large mechanized infantry with massive logistical arms) manners. I mean, the reality is we have not successfully prosecuted an asymmetrical war since the Phillipine-American War at the turn of the 20th century, (and were only able to do so because American commanders had no qualms about committing atrocities to weed out guerillas) and have never done a good job of training our forces to fight anything other than large, conventional, set-piece type engagements. So, how can we expect the troops (and contractors) tasked with training indigenous Afghan forces to create a force that they cannot conceive of or defeat?

  • koabd

    “(re: large mechanized infantry with massive logistical arms)”
    .
    Whoops, I omitted a word there. It should read “re: NOT large mechanized infantry with massive logisitical arms).”

  • Joe Klein

    My sense, Pint, is that Marja was chosen because it was just so obvious–a defiant Taliban redoubt that had to be dealt with after U.S. forces entered Helmand. As you’ve probably noticed over time, I agree with your larger point, though: I have no idea why U.S. troops are in Helmand when the center of the insurgency is next door in Kandahar.

    On another point, I’m still trying to get my brain around koabd’s fabulous typo: mechanized calvary. There is something very profound and crosswise there.

  • jbaustian

    Quote: “I’ll be heading to Afghanistan soon to take a closer look at the situation, but my sense is that the Afghan Army and police aren’t nearly up to the task of controlling the city yet.”

    Again, Joe Klein admits that he knows nothing, yet is eager to offer an opinion anyway.

    My question is this: does Klein know anything about anything? or is he merely notable for his total ignorance on all topics?

  • koabd

    “On another point, I’m still trying to get my brain around koabd’s fabulous typo: mechanized calvary.”
    .
    I’ll own up to typing “mechanized calvary” when it is actually “mechanized infantry.” Fingers and mind working at cross purposes.

blog comments powered by Disqus