After Action

Great that the military learns from their mistakes. Many of us hold our breaths for an outpouring of continuing proactive initiatives in the war on terror.

LM
http://theblindspotsofgod.wordpress.com/2010/01/08/technology-savvy-nigerian-criminals-are-the-greatest-threat-to-national-security/

At the lower echelons of the military, the ability to learn lessons and make changes is quite important. If you don’t learn, you can get yourself killed.
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Unfortunately, in the upper levels, as things get a lot more politically-oriented, the changes needed are too often oriented toward optics or a change in politics. Too often, they feel they failed because it looked bad or because their political skills weren’t sharp enough.
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So, you learn to “spin” or “play the political game” better to enhance your career goals.

How true! When it is required, people (in the lower levels of the military) are compelled to change and learn because it is a matter of life and death for THEM.

When all that is at stake is moving ahead career wise, it is slower, harder and almost always politically controlled. Little wonder the war on terror always seems so incredibly reactive. The upper echelon just takes it good old time to spin and play.

Good point!

LM

Exum suggests that the CIA needs a thorough after action review and that Panetta’s op-ed suggests that such a review might be inadequate due to institutional defensiveness. He probably has a good point. What I found interesting was the linked Reuel Marc Gerecht piece suggesting insisting that the CIA needs a shake-up but specifically stipulating that the shake-up not include any accountability for the torture regime.

While I stop short of the position of many that there should be prosections, the idea that there should be no accountability whatsoever for what can only be described as horrible tradecraft is just as misguided as the unwillingness to examine what went wrong in Afghanistan.

“…the military is one of the only outposts of Big Government that actively tries to learn from its mistakes …”

Examples other than those mentioned in your post?

Mr. Klein, The President and the Pentagon have stated to the effect that the people of Afghanistan are the “center of gravity” in this war. I agree that the counterinsurgency is focused on protecting Afghanis. The primary objective of a COIN operation is to develop an effective and legitimate government in the host nation (effective, one assumes in representing the people). Yet I don’t feel that the Karzai administration is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people, and it’s doubtful that someone as corrupt as Karzai has shown to be will become an effective representative.
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You mentioned a few posts back that Obama plans to review operations in one year while the military seems to believe success will take ten years. Within the next 1 – 10 years, do you expect that we will see an Afghani government that is both supported by the US and legitimized by the Afghan population?
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I’m not optimistic. I trust our military and intelligence will “actively… learn from its mistakes”; but not so sure we can craft a plan to make the counterinsurgency happen.

JK : Before I say anything can you clear up an issue for me. I have seen and head Bob Baer and Reuel Marc Gerecht. It appeared to me that Gerect was grinding an axe. He is the Neocon of neocons so how objective is he when he makes assessments. Put another way does Gerect let the evidence lead him or does he pick and choose to get to a pre-ordained position?

…but the military is one of the only outposts of Big Government that actively tries to learn from its mistakes, which should be one of the models for better management of the civilian government…

Really? You should try this. Funny but sad that the Securities and Exchange Commission – Enforcement program was rated as “Results Not Demonstrated”…in 2004. The improvement plan shows:

Working with other enforcement programs to establish measures that better reflect effectiveness, including the development of an efficiency measure.

This all being said, most of the programs listed are overdue for an audit. That being said, it looks like some programs can’t be just canceled unless it’s done thru Congressional legislation.

Willingness to learn from a mistake is directly related to the visibility and public consequences of said mistake.
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The CIA is only concerned about the mistakes it thinks others know or can find out about.

Hence the almost-universal tendency to try to hide or cover up as a first reaction.

And I do acknowledge that this is most assuredly NOT limited to the CIA.

“The system of After Action Reports (AAR) and Lesson Learned has really improved U.S. military performance as the Army and Marines have had to learn how to conduct aymmetrical warfare in the past decade.”

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Darn, here I thought I was learning a new word. But, I suppose it is a simple typo.
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With that said,
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“It has reduced the level of brutality and, indeed, was a key component in the development of the Counterinsurgency doctrine–which places more emphasis on protecting people and discourages indiscriminate violence.”

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In Joe’s mind, not only has our military, but our CIA has been “brutal” and “violent”. Wow, that is a major accusation, is it not Joe?
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I know you do not like water-boarding, that you have made very clear. I know that you believe that anything other than “following the Geneva Convention Rules” on how prisoners and in this case terrorists are to be treated.
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Does the Geneva Convention mention anywhere about be-heading? Have you written any positions that you may have in al-Jazeera on be-headings, and how this is not following the Geneva Convention “rules” for this conflict? Have you received any feedback from your Arab followers in al-Jazeera as to what they feel about your recommendations?

Does the Geneva Convention mention anywhere about be-heading?

Yes, It has very specific prohibitions against collective punishment. Simply stated, you aren’t allowed to hold Afghan villagers responsible for action they didn’t personally commit. Which means that your mention of beheadings is utterly incoherent.

Joe is of course referring to the fact that since we are allied with the purported Afghan government then we can’t act as if we are war with the Afghan population. The practice of calling airstrikes against any location thought to contain insurgents was causing significantly more problems than it was solving. We have disconinued the practice and it’s certainly helped. The US troop presence recently polled well among the Afghan population at large.

I know that you have difficulty realizing that we have lots of Muslim allies, but fortunately you are miles away from where such things matter.

Gerecht is an interesting character.

OOH, in the Summer of 2001 (aka “the Summer of Threats”) The Atlantic Monthly published an amazingly candid article by Gerecht that described how the U.S. had effectively no clandestine operations that might bring down bin Laden and al Qaeda: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200107/gerecht

OTOH, post-9/11, Gerecht has vacillated between providing insightful analysis:

Whereas al Qaeda is showing increasing proficiency, the same cannot be said for the CIA. Competent case officers can get duped by a good double. And [Jordan's] GID, whose skill has been exaggerated in fiction and film and by Hashemite-stroked American case officers, isn’t a global service. Take it far from its tribal society, where it operates with admirable efficiency, and it is nothing to write home about.

The CIA uses the GID so often not because the Jordanians are brilliant but because the Americans are so often, at best, mediocre. The GID’s large cadre of English-speaking officers makes liaison work easy with Langley, which has never been blessed with a large number of Arabic-speaking officers, particularly within the senior ranks.

and Jack Bauer-inspired, testosterone fueled bloviations:

Mr. Obama may have foreclosed the possibility of the CIA again aggressively questioning jihadists, but he’s kept the door wide open for the rendition of terrorists to countries like Jordan, where the GID does not abide by the Marquess of Queensbury rules in its interrogations.

[...] Mr. Obama [...] may at some level still believe that his let’s-just-all-be-friends speech in Cairo last June made a big dent in the hatred that many faithful Muslims have for the U.S., but his practices on the ground are likely to be a lot less touchy-feely. This is all for the good.

Paul- Assuming the we are referring to the same poll, Juan Cole discusses (link):

“A poll of 1500 Afghans carried out in every province of the country in December, 2009, found that Afghans are more optimistic about the direction of their country than last year, and largely satisfied with the Karzai government and with the presence of foreign troops.
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…these results would not hold for Helmad, Qandahar, and Nangarhar, I’m betting. Some 20 percent of Afghanistan is under the rule of insurgent groups, including the Taliban, and the poll was certainly not carried out in those districts…
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The summer 2009 poll… showed substantial provincial variations; this one is not reporting at that level of detail.
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…For Tajiks (Persian-speaking Sunnis), Hazaras (Persian-speaking Shiites), and Uzbeks (Turkic-speaking Sunnis), the Western presence has been a relatively good thing and rid them of the hated Taliban.
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But significant (regional) populations… don’t feel this way, and nor do some other Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan and some regions of neighboring Pakistan.
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…Nearly half (polled) wanted foreign troops out within 18 months or sooner, while 29% said it depended on the situation.”

My reliance on the poll was to simply remind rusty that not every Muslim is our enemy and that our actual gripe is with a tiny fraction of the population of the Middle East. There are lots of people who are so caught up in this ‘Clash of Civilizations” that they remind blindly ignorant of this simple fact.