Today in Pakistan

40 minutes gone by and still no comments. 2 theories:
1) Our minds are obviously on domestic issues, and/or
2) This article in fact succeeded in depressing us.

It’s still early here on the West Coast so I just read it – but yes, depressing!
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Thanks for the link, JK.
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I’m struck by the notion that Congress wouldn’t authorize $7.5B when it was quite happy to cough up $1T on the war. “Large sums” are relative. (Whether that money would be well-spent is another question.)

” .. one of the world’s most fearless journalists and the very best .. “

Don’t know now what that means.
[Although I did - some years ago.]

actually Joe, its because we’ve already read this nonsense coming from Joe before — its the same “the Taliban is coming! the Taliban is coming!” alarmist crap that Joe serves up on a regular basis.
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but the reality is that the Swat district contains less than 1% of Pakistans population, and is geographically isolated from all major population centers of Pakistan (the Swat valley is 80 miles from islamabad “as the crow flies”….but a couple of hundred miles by road because Swat is surrounded by mountains). Most of the mountainous areas in the northwest of Pakistan are “pakistani” only because of how the British empire drew the borders — and the differences in culture between those mountainous areas is profound.

The army is demoralized and overstretched, and has declined to accept U.S. offers to retrain its regular forces in counter-insurgency because it still perceives a much larger threat from its traditional enemy, India.
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I know I’m occasionally susceptable to naivity but is it really in India’a interest to have it’s nearest neighbor succumb to Islamic exremism? Certainly their own interest is better served by seeking accomodation rather than watch their ‘traditional’ enemy fall to an even worse threat.

Rashid does make depressing reading as does his book Descent into Chaos. Pakistan has been written off before; and I understand the Army’s pre-occupation with India. Rashid’s writing in the LA Times has no impact in Swat.

Joe: only the Pakistanis can deal with this and all the handwringing about slow American aid is not going to help. If the Pakistanis cannot fight for their own country then they are in trouble. Do you think the Taliban bring goods and services with them? Their chaotic rule in Afghanistan is a stark reminder of their ability at undermining established governments and replacing them with an hopelessly inefficient one. No, only the Pakistanis can deal with this; and the excuse about India as the enemy does not play so well nowadays. We are exercised because of the Pakistan Bomb.

Plukasiak, if I assume that your statements are correct, can you also reassure us that any of that will help the corrupt and inept Pakistani government resist their slow but continued collapse? It just seems to me that the Taliban et al rather thrive in some of the world’s most unforgiving terrain. So although I’m usually the first to resist the Chicken Little approach to commentary, I’m inclined to agree with JK here. Yes, I AM depressed as hell by all this. Scared sh**tless, too.

collapse of Pakisan
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For the record, missing T

It is both in India and Pakistan’s interest to settle on Kashmir’s independence. My discussions with official in New Delhi a year ago showed that the Indians understand this and have worked to garner political support among the parties. Because India is a democracy it suffers from the usual posturing of Hindu extremists. And we know what bipartisanship has done here.Their argument is that Pakistan’s leaders have never been able to mobilise the political and army support to make it possible for the dispute to be settled.

Is it realistic to drive the Taliban totally underground in the expectation of eventual obliteration of extremism? Is is possible that a part of the population does not consider itself to be victims of Islamic fundamentalism, but devotees?
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I suggest that allowing open fundamentalist regions to exist is not necessarily as alarming as proposed. With some reasonable accomidation (if that is even possible, I don’t really know), those devotee should be allowed to practice their insanity with an agreeable population, as opposed to a captive oppressed one. While I don’t agree with the alarmist view of this development as expressed by Klein, I am afraid junkmailqueen’s Chicken Little approach drives American foreign policy. Please remember the WMP’s and destruction of Iraq.

Formerlyjames, Chicken Little is new to me. (Several life-changing experiences have made me either cautious or paranoid, you pick.) In any case, I don’t disagree with you. That doesn’t mean I’m not scared as hell. I seem to remember a time when we were actually succeeding in *fighting* the Taliban and stabilizing the country, before we were dragged off to Iraq, and I keep wondering if we can get that back before the entire Pakistani government falls. Maybe that’s just a hazy, rose-colored memory. I’m asking questions here because I just don’t know.

junkmailqueen, I understood what you were saying and it was a more reasonable assessment than that of Klein and Rashid. I referred to you mostly to borrow your chicken little term. They seem to not recognize that the northwest region in question has never been and probably never will be under any semblance of governmental control. Some compromise and recognition might allow those captives in the region to be allowed to escape their predicament there.

“so they can move away from tribal areas adjoining Afghanistan, where increasingly successful attacks by U.S. drones have made survival difficult.”

This is just happy talk and wishful thinking. No mention about why the ‘Taliban’ were successful in Swat, like the corruption A different article I read mentioned brothels (run by wealthy landlords) were blown up, not girl’s schools. Perhaps both were. Perhaps we’ll never get the truth, just propaganda.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KA31Df01.html

“During my visit, every sub-district and village I passed through told of the alienation caused by bad governance which had allowed a Taliban vigilante force to emerge and flourish. “

“During my visit, every sub-district and village I passed through told of the alienation caused by bad governance which had allowed a Taliban vigilante force to emerge and flourish. ”
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Support of such bad governance, on our part, is why our history in that part of the world is one of moving to contain one crisis after another.
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Anyone suppose the British and Soviets went through the same experience? Hmm??

formerlyjames: But what is an “agreeable” population? Does that include the women or only the men? (I was reading about the Taliban in Ms magazine years before the mainstream press picked up on it.)
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From what I’ve read, in Afghanistan it’s the corruption and inefficiency of the central government that allows the Taliban to flourish.
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In Pakistan, is it essentially a question of tribal loyalties?

Heaven forbid that we should actually learn from the history of that part of the world . . .

Art Pepper, by agreeable, I meant those who want to be governed by taliban rule and law, and allowing exit for those not so inclined, as well as entry for those wanting to join in the fun and games. Just a point of discussion, probably not even possible.

Plukasiak, if I assume that your statements are correct, can you also reassure us that any of that will help the corrupt and inept Pakistani government resist their slow but continued collapse
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Pakistan has a history of military takeover of its government, and I don’t see anything telling me that Pakistan will collapse in ways other than that which brings on another in an endless series of military takeovers.
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The odds of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons coming under the control of the Taliban are, for all intents and purposes, non-existent — if for no other reason than that the military would not permit it. To put it another way, I think that the potential of islamic extremists taking over Saudi Arabia represents a much more likely threat to US national security, but I don’t see that happening anytime soon either.

what exactly is an “agreeable” population in this case? in this sort of repressive regime, simply questioning or renouncing Islam is a capital offense. If people in these areas don’t wish to follow sharia law, do they have alternatives? do the girls who will now be banned from school have any option but to marry whoever their father tells them and live their lives in this backwards society? This sort of fundamentalism is a cancer, any suggestion otherwise is just naive.

Formerly: I got you. I’m just saying, “those who want to” would include a lot of people who really don’t want to. (And what archstanton said.)
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The U.S. needs to thread the needle between ignoring the problem and rushing in with cockamamie plans involving pallets of cash and guns.
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We have always tended to oscillate between the two.

“We have always tended to oscillate between the two.”
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Art Pepper,
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Are you saying we tend to react to the situation of the moment rather than having a thought-out policy?

Pakistan has a history of military takeover of its government … The odds of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons coming under the control of the Taliban are, for all intents and purposes, non-existent — if for no other reason than that the military would not permit it.

And can we assume that the military will never, ever become overrun by religious extremists? I’m not sure the two groups are mutually exclusive, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or anywhere else.

archstanton, I agree that fundamentalism is a cancer. Not only Islamic, but all religious primitave fundamentalism. I don’t defend it. Nor would I defend the Vatican or Zionists settlers if it would be possible to dismiss them. But it is not, so some means of co-existence is the only alternative. That is what I propose. We are defending corrupt regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as tribal chiefs whose attrocities are usually attributed to the Taliban. We continue to shoot ourselves in the foot. The diversion from efforts in Afghanistan to the senseless destruction of Iraq resulted in abdication of any hope in Afghanistan or Pakistan. They are not even real countries. They are a conglomeration of tribes. Make do as best as possible given the constraints. Accomadation is not necessarily appeasement. I fear that the war there will be Obama’s Viet Nam.

It’s realistic to expect Zardari’s regime to disintegrate sooner rather than later, with or without Taliban involvement. Zardari has a long record of corruption and sleaze, gained power largely because he was Benazir Bhutto’s husband, and has shown no sign of being capable of running even a stable modern country. The idea that this weak shyster is capable of dealing with a divided society, chronic poverty, and an insurgency fueled by radical Islam is simply beyond belief. I’d be very surprised if Zardari clings on for another year.
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Let it be noted that the fall of Zardari would hardly destroy Pakistan. In fact, it might arguably be a step towards better government and a more functional democracy. The question is whether Pakistan can find a better leader and beat back the Taliban – and whether the Pakistani population wants to do so. We tend to assume that nobody wants the Taliban, except, presumably, the Taliban. But what do the people of Pakistan want? Does anyone know?

I’m with P-luk on this, yet another Groundhog-Day drumbeat post.
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Junkmail: “Scared sh**tless, too”
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Well, after 8 years of the gov’t telling you to be afraid, be v. afraid, I can’t criticize you, but regardless of the party in power, I’d say that’s exactly how they want you to feel.

One more thought on this as well as Klein’s previous blog on Russia, if Russia were as devious as the American imperialist faction claims, it would serve their interests in payback to fund and arm the Islamic rebels against the American effort. Wonder if they ever thought of that in Moscow. Likely not, as they are up to their ears still dealing with them, just not any more in Afghanistan.

Formerlyjames, I think Moscow would see a difference between say Chechen separatists, for whom they have nothing but loathing, and the more remote, and possibly useful Taliban. The question really is to what extent different Islamic militants collaborate, and whether they can be dealt with as isolated groups. I don’t think it would be implausible for Moscow to embarrass say a militant hawk like Bush by quietly helping the Taliban with funds, in return for an undertaking to leave Chechnya alone. Whether such a deal would be possible would depend on solidarity between Islamic militants – or the lack thereof.

And can we assume that the military will never, ever become overrun by religious extremists? I’m not sure the two groups are mutually exclusive, in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or anywhere else.
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doubtful, insofar as its hard to ‘overrun’ any military organization from within, and the nature of military authority is incompatible with the dictates of religious extremism.

“…the nature of military authority is incompatible with the dictates of religious extremism..”

Not at all. There have been plenty of successful military groups bound together by religious extremism. How do you think the Arabs became the major power in the Near East in the 8th-11th centuries? Discipline, fanaticism and a willingness to die for a charismatic leader are generally assets in an army.

I recommend Salman Rushdie’s works, essays and novels both, for a solid grasp of Pakistani history, the secularism of the military et al. Midnight’s Children is particularly insightful.
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As for religion mixing with military states, the US is hardly innocent:
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/22/AR2005062200598.html

jcapan, thanks for that link to revisit the AFA religious zealot scandle coming on the heals of the AFA sexual harassment scandle. A little ot, but remember the AFA cadet whose girlfriend was at Anapolis, who before entering the vaulted military schools had murdered a rival girlfriend? I would guess that they prayed over it before committing the act.

Not at all. There have been plenty of successful military groups bound together by religious extremism
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what you are talking about are the military within theocratic states in which military authority derives from clerical authority. (The caliph’s of the abbasid dynasty were considered the successors of Mohammed) What I’m talking about are military organizations that don’t take their orders from clerics.

Not at all, pluk. The early Islamic armies were not commanded by clerics, and your definition is so restrictive that it makes nonsense of your earlier statement which was:

“the nature of military authority is incompatible with the dictates of religious extremism”

No mention there of clerics giving orders, so stop trying to weasel out of another of your patent over-generalizations. Do you think the Taliban demand their daily tactical briefing from the local mullah? Was Amr ibn al’As a cleric? Or Khalid ibn al-Walid? And if you want to cite Islamic history, you might note that the Abbasids made such a point of their religious credentials precisely because many considered them to be anything but successors of the prophet. They themselves were hardly clerics, and took steps to control them, while putting up a front of ostentatious piety. Your larger claim is either true under extremely limited circumstances, and thus pointless, or not true at all, despite your attempt to walk it back.

Not at all, pluk. The early Islamic armies were not commanded by clerics

yes they were — the caliphs were the head of state, and they were consdiered clerical figures. And while its certainly reasonable to argue that their personal pursuit of empire was based on secular considerations, it was as the “successor to Mohammed” acting in service to Allah, that they derived and exercised their power.

and your definition is so restrictive that it makes nonsense of your earlier statement which was:

I was discussing the prospect of the Pakistani military being “overrun” by islamic extremists — purely military authority, rather than a military/religious hybrid

pluk, you’ll find that the vast majority of Islamic armies have not been commanded by religious figures. Relatively few Caliphs, whether Ummayad or Abbasid commanded armies in the field, and in no case can you argue that their religion impaired their strategic of tactical ability or dictated their choices. And you did make a larger claim about the relationship between armies and religion, which was simply nonsensical. I notice that you shift your ground with every post. Why not simply man up and admit that you said something ill-advised?