There’s an odd disconnect about the situation in Iraq right now. On the one hand, you have the scrupulous military observer Anthony Cordesman–cited here by Charles Krauthammer–reporting significant progress on the ground, which is no doubt true despite the daily spray of gore. If you want to define the war as John McCain does–the fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq, or whatever you want to call the terrorists–then 2007 was a very good year. By the taqfiris’ own accounting in captured documents, their force declined from 12,000 or so to 3,500. The Sunnis have decisively turned against the terrorists, which is a very big deal. The neighborhoods of Baghdad are markedly safer, as a result of the Joint Security Stations that David Petraeus established (and also because of the ethnic cleansing that sent most Sunnis packing).
There is also the less convincing evidence of political reconciliation, also cited by Krauthammer, in the recent laws passed by the national government…which may or may not be significant. No one seems to be able to decode the recent deBaathification law. A budget seems to have been passed. The call for local, bottom-up elections in October is potentially very important, if they take place: such elections might clarify the strength of the Sunni Awakening movement and the relative strength of the Sadr and Hakim families in the south.
So this is progress, right? Things are getting better, right?
But one might argue with equal force and authority that the U.S. military battle against AQI and the doings of the Iraqi national assembly are peripheral to the central, existential questions of the Iraqi civil war: Is Iraq a country…and, if so, who’s going to be in charge of it? Right now, it’s possible to survey the country from the bottom up and see chaos in all three ethnic communities. Here, for example, is an account, via Juan Cole, of the constant low-grade warfare in Basra, a crucial part of the country we know little about (a recent attempt by CBS news to do some onscene reporting led to the kidnapping of two journalist–Basra is a very dangerous place.) I should add here that the “Iraqi Army” in Basra is actually controlled, for the most part, by the Badr Corps militia. These are clashes between supporters of the Sadr and Hakim families. This battle, shrouded in mystery and taking place throughout Shi’istan, is probably more crucial to the future of Iraq than the U.S. mop-up operations against AQI in Diyala Province and elsewhere. The U.S. has supported the Hakim family in this struggle–which may be a mistake: the Hakims are more susceptible to our blandishments, but traditionally much closer to Iran than the Sadrists. (U.S. intel officials tell me that Iran is hedging its bets by supporting both the Sadr and Hakim movements.) ADD: Sadr’s cease-fire extension only adds to the confusion–it seems partial, at best, and seems not to include Basra (or perhaps other areas outside the range of U.S. forces).
Speaking of Diyala, Marc Lynch of George Washington University, proprietor of the excellent blog Abu Aardvark, has been reporting for months about the intricacies of the Sunni Awakening movement–the differences between the early, tribal converts in Anbar Province and the later Baathist insurgents in Baghdad, Diyala and elsewhere, who decided that it was more convenient–for the moment–to stop fighting the Americans and start getting paid by them, in anticipation of the next big Sunni-Shi’ite battle. This is an explosive situation, with constant conflict–armed and political–between the Awakening Councils and local (Shi’ite) police, especially in Baquba.
And then, in the north, we have the Turks invading Kurdistan today–and, more important, the question of Kirkuk, where Kurdish leaders are demanding a referendum. If held, the referendum would most likely transfer control of Kirkuk (and the adjacent oil fields) to Kurdistan…this might, in turn, precipitate Arab-Kurd or Turk-Kurd fighting. The Turks have never forgotten what Winston Churchill knew, but chose to ignore: that the Kurdish area tacked onto Iraq in 1921 was more appropriately part of Turkey. (The British chose to append it to Iraq because of the oil fields.) At the U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha last week, a spoke to several regional experts who were convinced that the Turks would use any available excuse to invade and seize Kirkuk.
Let’s say, to be charitable, that everyone is right: that real progress has been made in the fight against the terrorists, that Baghdad is more secure, that the Iraqi national parliament is trying to write some legislation…and that there are deep, explosve divisions among Iraq’s ethnic groups.
Where does that leave us?
With, I’d guess, two missions–one achievable and one not. The achievable mission is completing the job of clearing out Al Qaeda, a victory that will have resonance throughout the region (and which will not require the continuing presence of 150,000 U.S. troops). The unachievable mission is refereeing the ethnic struggles among and between Shi’ites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turks–and Iranians. If we try to do that, we will be there in perpetuity–perhaps as long as McCain’s 100 years–and they will be bloody years, an even more arrogant and idiotic squandering of our national reputation than this disgraceful exercise has already been.